Paphos - Cyprus
October 18 - 20,
2009
Supported by:
University of Cyprus
Integrated Project
IST-015964
European
Association for Theoretical Computer
Science
Limassol Co-operative Savings
Bank Ltd
IBM Cyprus
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The session room will have a data/video-projector, a laptop, a screen and an
overhead projector.
Speakers planning an electronic
presentation may either
(i)
use the provided laptop
or
(ii)
bring their own laptop. (If you plan
to bring and use a mac/apple laptop,
you must also bring the adaptor
required for connecting to a
data/video-projector cable.)
Each contributed talk should go for
20 minutes, leaving some additional
minutes for discussion.
Tentative schedule
...........................................................................................................................................................................
Saturday 17 October 2009
Sunday 18 October 2009
-
8:00-9:15 Registration
-
9:15-10:15 Invited Talk by Elias Koutsoupias:
Approximate Price of Anarchy and Stability
Session
Chair: Marios Mavronicolas
-
10:15-10:45 Coffee Break
-
10:45-12:25 Session 1 (Congestion Games)
Session Chair: Edith Elkind
-
Tobias Harks, Max Klimm
and Rolf H. Moehring,
Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted
Congestion Games
-
Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini and Luca Moscardelli,
Performances of One-Round Walks in Linear Congestion Games
-
Tanmoy Chakraborty and
Sanjeev Khanna,
Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games
-
Andrew Byde, Maria
Polukarov and Nicholas Jennings,
Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities
-
12:30-14:30 Lunch Break
-
14:30-16:10 Session 2 (Potpourri)
Session Chair: Elias Koutsoupias
-
Yoram Bachrach, Edith
Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dmitrii Pasechnik, Michael Zuckerman,
Joerg Rothe and Jeffrey
Rosenschein,
The Cost of Stability and Its Application to Weighted Voting Games
-
Hyunwoo Jung and
Kyung-Yong Chwa,
The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds
-
Rajiv Raman, Khaled
Elbassioni, Saurabh Ray and Rene Sitters,
On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems
-
Edith Elkind, Piotr
Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko,
Swap Bribery
-
16:10-16:40 Coffee Break
-
16:40-18:20 Session 3 (Scheduling and Routing)
Session Chair: Vittorio Bilo
-
Elliot Anshelevich and
Satish Ukkusuri,
Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing
-
Ronald Koch and Martin
Skutella,
Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows Over Time
-
Kim Thang Nguyen and
Christoph Dürr,
Non-Clairvoyant Scheduling Games
-
Christine Chung and
Evangelia Pyrga,
Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games
Monday 19 October 2009
-
9:15-10:15 Invited Talk by Mihalis Yannakakis:
Computational Aspects of Equilibria
Session
Chair: Paul Spirakis
-
10:15-10:45 Coffee Break
-
10:45-12:25 Session 4 (Solution Concepts and Complexity)
Session Chair: Pino Persiano
-
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer and Jan Hoffmann,
The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles
-
Michal Feldman and Moshe
Tennenholtz,
Partition Equilibrium
-
Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer and Kamesh Munagala,
Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To
-
Felix Brandt, Markus
Brill, Felix Fischer and Paul Harrenstein,
On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games
-
12:30-14:00 Lunch Break
-
14:00 Bus departure to excursion (excursion program)
Tuesday 20 October 2009
-
9:15-10:15 Invited Talk
by
Noam Nisan
:
Google´s Auction for TV ads
Session
Chair: Burkhard
Monien
-
10:15-10:45 Coffee
Break
-
10:45-12:25 Session 5 (Potpourri)
Session
Chair:
Michal
Feldman
-
Elliot Anshelevich, Sanmay Das and Yonatan
Naamad,
Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating
Better Matchings
-
Leah
Epstein and Asaf Levin,
On equilibria for ADM minimization games
-
Martin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich and Alexander
Skopalik,
Doing Good with Spam is Hard
-
Elliot Anshelevich and Bugra Caskurlu,
Price of Stability in Survivable Network
Design
-
12:30-14:30 Lunch
Break
-
14:30-16:10 Session 6
(Mechanism Design and Auctions)
Session Chair: Krzysztof Apt
-
Shahar
Dobzinski and Noam Nisan,
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem
-
Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman and Guy Wolfovitz,
A Perfect Auction Derandomization
-
Po-An Chen and David Kempe.
Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes
-
Moshe Babaioff,
Michal
Feldman
and Noam
Nisan,
Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial
Agency
-
16:10-16:40 Coffee
Break
-
16:40-18:45 Session 7 (Mechanisms)
Session Chair: George Christodoulou
-
Andre
Berger, Rudolf Mόller and Seyed Hossein
Naeemi,
Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for
Convex Valuations
-
Clemens Thielen and Sven Krumke,
Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and
Two-Parameter Agents
-
Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm,
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal
Mechanisms
-
Jose
Correa
and
Nicolas
Figueroa,
On the planner’s loss due to lack of
information in Bayesian mechanism design
-
Krzysztof Apt and Arantza
Estevez-Fernandez,
Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public
project problems
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