

Preference-based Argumentation

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- 1 General Argumentation
- 2 Preference-based Argumentation (PBA)
- 3 Structural properties of PBA
- 4 Computational properties of PBA
- 5 PBA and Negotiation

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 - **Reason**: Because Tweety is a bird and birds fly
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- Argumentation can be used for:
 - **Internal agent's reasoning**
 - **Modelling interactions between agents**

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- **premise/reason:**

John has political responsibilities

and

\mathcal{I} is in the national interest

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if a person has pol. resp. and info about that person is in the national interest then that info should be published

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- A3 (John does have pol. resp. because he is now middle east envoy, and if a person...)

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- The sets $\{a, b\}$, $\{b, c\}$ and $\{a, b, c\}$ are **not** conflict-free

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- Let $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \mathcal{A}$. \mathcal{B} is a **stable** extension iff
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- A **kernel** of a (di)graph $G = (V, E)$ is a set $K \subseteq V$ such that
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- Introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944

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Stable extensions and graph kernels

- Stable extensions of T **correspond exactly** to the kernels of the associated graph \mathcal{G}_T (Dimopoulos+Torres 1996)
- A graph may have **one or many** kernels...
- ...or **no** kernels at all
- Reasoning with stable/admissible extensions is hard
 - Deciding the **existence** of stable extensions is **NP-hard**
 - Deciding the existence of an **non-empty** admissible extension is **NP-hard**

Preference-based Argumentation

- An extension of classical argumentation

Basic Idea: We often have preferences over arguments

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- **This work:** Study the properties of a specific Preference-based Argumentation Framework

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- $\mathcal{A} = \{a, b, c\}$

Preference-based Argumentation - Example


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- All results are based on **transitivity**

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
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- stable extensions = **most preferred** sets wrt \triangleright **permitted** by \mathcal{C}

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
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
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
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- $\{a\}$ is the **unique** stable extension



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- **General Idea** of the algorithm:
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 - Add the argument to the stable extension and simplify
 - Repeat on the remaining theory
- **Key property**: There **always exists** a "self-defending" argument

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 - Complex interaction between arguments
 - Must find the right combination of other arguments
- Deciding whether **a** is included in **every** stable extension is **co-NP-hard**

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Theories without incomparability

- Reasoning becomes a bit easier if there is no **incomparability**
i.e. there are no $a, b \in \mathcal{A}$ s.t. $a \not\preceq b$ and $b \not\preceq a$
- Key Properties**
 - Correspondence between the stable extensions of T and **Maximal Independent Sets** of \mathcal{G}_T
 - Maximal Independent Sets can be computed with **Polynomial Delay**
- The stable extensions can be computed with **Polynomial Delay**
- Exponential** worst case behavior
A theory with n arguments can have $n^{n/3}$ stable extensions

Negotiation

- **Negotiation**: search for a mutually acceptable **agreement** between two (or several agents) on one or more issues
- **Offers** ranked by their utility

Reservation value

- **Alternate Offers Protocol**

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 - Deadline?

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- Characteristics of Negotiation
 - Deadline?
 - Can I accept an offer that I have previously rejected?
 - Issue by issue?

- **Offers** supported by arguments

Argument preference determines offer preference

Best offer is supported by the most preferred argument

- Performatives: *Propose, Argue, Reject, Agree, Nothing, Withdraw....*